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The Sago mine disaster was a dramatic reminder of the need for con-
stant vigilance and strong action to protect the safety and health of our nation's
miners. Sago and subsequent tragedies exposed a system of weak enforcement
of the mine safety law and the need for mandatory standards to put better com-
munications and rescue operations in place. Congress acted after the Sago, Ara-
coma, and Darby mine disasters in 2006 to enact a bipartisan package of legisla-
tive reforms that required improvements in communications and emergency
response, and significantly increased penalties for violations of the Federal Mine
Safety and Health Act ("MINER Act"), among other measures.' Legislation to
further strengthen the Mine Act passed the House of Representatives in January
of 2008.2 Congress has ratcheted up its oversight of the mine safety agency and
has made clear it expects to see progress by the Mine Safety and Health Ad-
ministration ("MSHA") on improving safety and health protections for miners.3
These measures are urgently needed, and long overdue.
* Associate General Counsel, AFL-CIO. I want to thank Peg Seminario, the AFL-CIO's
Director of Safety and Health, for her assistance in preparing this Article.
I Mine Improvement and New Emergency Response of 2006 (MINER Act), Pub. L. No. 109-
236, 120 Stat. 493.
2 S-Miner Act, H.R. 2768, 110th Cong. (2007).
3 See IMPLEMENTATION OF THE MINER ACT Is PROCEEDING Too SLOWLY, AN INTERIM STAFF
REPORT, COMM. ON EDUCATION AND LABOR, U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES (Feb. 27, 2007),
available at http://edlabor.house.gov/publications/MinerActStatus022707.pdf.
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All too often, it takes tragedies like Sago, and more recently Crandall
Canyon, to get the public, and Congress's, attention on the need to strengthen
the law. It was not until after reports of Love Canal and people having to aban-
don their homes that Congress enacted the Superfund law to force cleanup of
4contaminated sites. It was not until after the Bhopal disaster in India, where a
release from a Union Carbide plant killed at least 3,500 people and injured more
than 200,000, that Congress passed legislation giving communities in the United
States the right to know about toxic releases in their communities. The legisla-
tion also required the Occupational Safety and Health Administration ("OSHA")
and the Environmental Protection Agency ("EPA") to adopt rules to prevent
chemical plant explosions in the United States. And it took the Sago, Aracoma,
and Darby disasters to bring about Congressional action to strengthen the mine
safety law.
Unfortunately, workplace tragedies have not led to similar improve-
ments in the nation's primary workplace safety law. The Occupational Safety
and Health Act ("OSH Act") was enacted in 1970 and signed into law by Presi-
dent Nixon.6 The law sets forth an important and far-reaching promise: "to
assure so far as possible every working man and woman in the Nation safe and
healthful working conditions ....", Since the law's passage, much progress has
been made in addressing workplace hazards and bringing down the number of
work-related injuries, illnesses, and fatalities. But the OSH Act's promise has
yet to be fulfilled. Each year, thousands of workers still are killed by workplace
hazards, and millions more are injured. The toll these injuries exact on workers,
employers, and society is enormous.
In the nearly 40 years since the OSH Act's passage, the law has not
been significantly amended or strengthened. Inexplicably, tragedies in work-
places across the United States - such as a 1991 fire at a chicken processing
plant in Hamlet, North Carolina where 25 workers died behind locked doors, 8 a
2005 explosion at BP Amoco in Texas that killed 15 workers and injured 180
more, 9 and most recently a dust explosion at the Imperial Sugar refinery in Port
4 Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and Liability Act, 42 U.S.C. §
9601-9675 (2000); see OFFICE OF SOLID WASTE AND EMERGENCY RESPONSE, U.S.
ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY, SUPERFUND: 20 YEARS OF PROTECTING HUMAN HEALTH
AND THE ENVIRONMENT (2000), available at http://www.epa.gov/superfund/20years/20yrpt 1.pdf.
5 Emergency Planning and Community Right-To-Know Act, 42 U.S.C. § 11001 et. seq.
(2000); Pub. L. No.. 10 1-549, 104 Stat. 2399 (1990).
6 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (1970).
7 Occupational Safety and Health Act (OSHA) of 1970, 29 U.S.C. § 651(b) (2000).
8 Ronald Smothers, 25 Die, Many Reported Trapped, As Blaze Engulfs Carolina Plant, N.Y.
TIMES, Sept. 4, 1991, at Al.
9 Ralph Blumenthal, 14 Die in Blast at BP Refinery in Texas, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 24, 2005, at
A14; http://edlabor.house.gov/micro/workersafety-.bptexascity.shtm. See also Testimony of
Carolyn Merritt, Chairman and Chief Executive Officer of the U.S. Chemical Safety Board Before
the House Comm. on Education and Labor (Mar. 22, 2007) (detailing numerous shortcomings in
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Wentworth, Georgia, that killed 13 and injured 1110 - have not produced the sort
of public and Congressional clamor for strengthening the law as we saw with
Sago and subsequent disasters and the Mine Act.
Part of the problem is that most workplace fatalities go largely unno-
ticed. Workers die on the job in ones and twos, and their deaths typically get at
most a short mention in the daily newspaper: "worker dies in trench cave-in,"
"worker electrocuted," or "worker dies in accident." Rarely do reporters look
into the causes of workplace fatalities or report on any OSHA enforcement pro-
ceedings. Unlike the Sago and Crandall Canyon catastrophes, where miners
were trapped and there was 24-hour news coverage of the rescue operation, for
the most part workplace fatalities escape public notice. After a short news blip,
the story vanishes from public view.
Just as Congress did with the Mine Act after the Sago, Aracoma, and
Darby tragedies, it is time for Congress to update and strengthen the OSH Act to
improve protections for workers and to reduce the staggering and persistent toll
of workplace injuries, fatalities, and disease. In several areas, Congress can
look to the Mine Act for meaningful reforms, because in several important re-
spects, the Mine Act is stronger and more protective than its sister law.
This article begins with an overview of the OSH Act and the progress
that has been made in addressing workplace injuries, fatalities, and disease since
the law's passage. It then describes some of the shortcomings in the current
law, and explains how the Mine Act provides stronger protections in certain
areas. The article concludes with recommendations on several priority areas for
legislative reform.
I. OVERVIEW OF THE OCCUPATIONAL SAFETY AND HEALTH ACT
The Occupational Safety and Health Act1 was a precursor to the 1977
Federal Mine Safety and Health Act,' 2 and the laws are similar in many re-
spects. Both laws are centered around the development and enforcement of
mandatory workplace safety and health standards that require work practices,
technological controls, training, and other measures to protect workers from
the implementation and enforcement of the OSH Act and OSHA standards), available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/032207CarolynMerritttestimony.pdf.
10 Associated Press, 13th Blast Victim Dies, N.Y. TIMES, Mar. 15, 2008, at A13. See also
Testimony of William Wright, Board Member and Interim Executive of the U.S. Chemical Safety
Board Before the House Committee on Education and Labor (Mar. 12, 2008) (detailing need for
stronger measures to prevent explosions from combustible dust), available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_house hearings&docid=f:41041 .pdf.
I1 Pub. L. No. 91-596, 84 Stat. 1590 (Dec. 29, 1970).
12 Pub. L. No. 95-164, 91 Stat. 1290 (Nov. 9,1977).
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harms caused by hazards on the job.13 Both laws give workers and their repre-
sentatives rights to information about job hazards and rights to participate in the
enforcement process. 14
The OSH Act has significantly improved safety and health conditions
for American workers. Mandatory workplace standards on hazards like lead,
asbestos, and cotton dust have greatly reduced worker exposure to these dangers
and prevented occupational diseases like cancer, asbestosis, and brown lung.
Standards on grain dust have greatly reduced the number of explosions in silos,
and rules on machine guarding have prevented countless amputations and other
injuries. Right-to-know rules like the hazard communication standard, 15 rules
on employee access to medical records,' 6 and other regulatory requirements give
workers important information about job hazards and about their exposure to
toxic substances.
In 1970, the year the OSH Act was passed, 13,800 workers were killed
by workplace hazards, for a fatality rate of 18 deaths per 100,000 workers.' 7 In
2006 - the latest year for which comprehensive statistics are available - 5,703
workers were killed on the job,' 8 for a rate of 3.9 per 100,000 workers - a sig-
nificant improvement from the days before the OSH Act was passed. 19
The progress in reducing workplace injuries, illnesses, and fatalities
since the passage of the OSH Act is encouraging, but too many workers are still
being killed, maimed, or sickened by workplace hazards. In 2006, more than
5,700 workers were killed on the job - an average of 15 workers each and every
day. 20 They died from falls, from being struck by objects or crushed in machin-
ery, in electrocutions, in fires and explosions, and other causes. 2' Over 4 mil-
lion workers were injured on the job in 2006 - an average of over 11,000 each
13 See generally 29 U.S.C. § 655 (occupational safety and health standards); 29 U.S.C. § 657
(2000) (workplace inspections); 30 U.S.C. § 811 (2000) (mandatory safety and health standards);
30 U.S.C. § 813 (2000) (inspections, investigations, and recordkeeping).
14 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7); 29 U.S.C. § 657(e); 30 U.S.C. § 81 l(a)(7); 30 U.S.C. § 813(0.
15 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1200 (2007).
16 29 C.F.R. § 1910.1020 (2007).
17 AFL-CIO, DEATH ON THE JOB: THE TOLL OF NEGLECT 27 (16th ed. Apr. 2007), available at
http://www.aflcio.org/issues/safety/memorial/upload/doj-2007.pdf.
18 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, available at
http://www.bls.gov/iff/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0005.pdf.
19 These numbers do not reflect deaths from occupational diseases like cancer. Statistics on
occupational disease are difficult to come by because of the long latency period associated with
them, and other recordkeeping problems. Experts estimate that 50,000 - 60,000 workers die each
year from occupational disease caused by exposure to toxic substances at on the job. See AFL-
CIO, supra note 17, at 2.
20 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES 13, available at
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/cfoi/cfch0005.pdf.
21 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NATIONAL CENSUS OF FATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES IN
2006, available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/cfoi.pdf.
[Vol. I111
4
West Virginia Law Review, Vol. 111, Iss. 1 [2008], Art. 9
https://researchrepository.wvu.edu/wvlr/vol111/iss1/9
WORKERS A T RISK
and every day. 22 Workers were injured in falls, struck by equipment, sickened
by exposure to toxic chemicals, or developed repetitive strain injuries like carpal
tunnel syndrome. 23 The workplace injury rate in 2006 was 4.4 per 100 full-time
equivalent workers. 24 This means on average that one in 25 workers is hurt on
the job each year. The true toll is likely much higher. Government statistics are
25based on employer reports, which are often underinclusive. A recent study
compared employer logs of injuries and illnesses with other sources (for exam-
ple, workers compensation cases and occupational disease registries) and found
that the employer logs only captured one-third of workplace injuries and ill-
nesses. 26 Extrapolating from government statistics, this study suggests that the
true number of injuries could be as high as 12 million annually.
The toll of workplace injuries on workers and their families is stagger-
ing. The direct financial costs - lost wages and medical care - are $48 billion
per year, according to the Liberty Mutual insurance company.27 This does not
account for indirect costs like lost productivity or training. When these costs are
added in, the toll rises to between $145.8 billion and $291.6 billion annually.28
These numbers do not reflect the pain, hardship, and other human costs that
workplace injuries and illnesses impose on workers, their co-workers, and their
families. Plainly, the OSH Act has not yet lived up to its promise, because of
shortcomings in the law and its enforcement, as described below.
II. WEAKNESSES IN OSHA ENFORCEMENT
The Occupational Safety and Health Administration - the agency
charged with implementing and enforcing the OSH Act - faces a massive task.
Federal OSHA, together with state OSHA programs, are responsible for enforc-
ing the OSH Act at 8.5 million workplaces where 131 million workers are em-
ployed.29 This includes every job, every industry, and every hazard imaginable.
22 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, WORKPLACE INJURIES AND ILLNESSES IN 2006, available at
http://www.bls.gov/iff/oshwc/osh/os/osnr0O28.pdf.
23 BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, NONFATAL OCCUPATIONAL INJURIES, AND ILLNESSES
REQUIRING DAYS AWAY FROM WORK, 2006 available at
http://www.bls.gov/iif/oshwc/osh/case/osnr0029.pdf.
24 Id.
25 See, e.g., Kerry Hall, Ames Alexander and Franco Ordonez, The Cruelest Cuts, CHARLOTTE
OBSERVER, Feb. 10, 2008, at IA (describing working conditions and worker injuries in House of
Raeford poultry processing plants, under-reporting of injuries, and retaliation against workers who
report injuries).
26 Kenneth D. Rosenman., et al., How Much Work-Related Injury and Illness is Missed by the
Current National Surveillance System?, 48 J. OCCUP. AND ENVTL. MED. 357, 360 (Apr. 2006).
27 2006 LIBERTY MUTUAL WORKPLACE SAFETY INDEX, http://www.wausau.com (search "2006
Liberty Mutual Workplace Safety Index"). See also AFL-CIO, supra at note 17, at 6.
28 See AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 6.
29 AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 7. The OSH Act authorizes states to run their own OSHA-
approved state programs, 29 U.S.C. 667(b), and 20 states plus Puerto Rico and the Virgin Islands
2008]
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OSHA enforces construction safety standards on construction sites, infectious
disease prevention rules at hospitals and nursing homes, rules limiting exposure
to toxins at manufacturing facilities, and more. The agency's jurisdiction is
incredibly broad and varied.
To undertake its mission to protect the health and safety of America's
workers, OSHA currently receives an annual appropriation from Congress of
less than $500 million, or $3.70 per covered worker.30 This funding level pales
in comparison with other public health and environmental protection agencies,
like the Food and Drug Administration, which receives $2.2 billion, 31 and the
Environmental Protection Agency, which receives $7.6 billion.32
At its current funding level, OSHA can support fewer staff than it had in
1975, even though the agency is responsible for enforcing the job safety law at
more than twice as many workplaces (3.9 million vs. 8.5 million) and the law
covers twice as many workers (67.8 million vs. 131.5 million).33 The number of
covered employees per OSHA full-time equivalent employee has grown from
27,845 in 1975 to 59,589 in 20 05 .34
There are approximately 2,000 federal and state OSHA inspectors to en-
force the job safety law at 8.5 million workplaces. 35 This amounts to one in-
spector for every 63,000 workers, far below international norms. 36 The Interna-
tional Labor Organization's ("ILO") standard on inspectors for industrialized
democracies is 1 inspector for every 10,000 covered workers.37 OSHA would
need another 5,000 federal and state inspectors to meet the ILO standard. At its
current level of inspectors, OSHA has the resources to inspect each workplace
under its jurisdiction on average once every 133 years.38 In contrast, under the
Mine Act, MSHA is obligated to inspect each underground coal mine four times
each year, and each surface mine twice each year.39
have elected to do so. Four additional states have plans that cover state and local government
employees, who are otherwise excluded from coverage under the OSH Act.
http://www.osha.gov/dcsp/osp/index.html.
30 AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 53. Under the continuing resolution for FY 2007, OSHA re-
ceived $485 million. Id.
31 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, H.R. 2764, Pub. L. No. 110-161, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname= 110_cong-house committeeprints&docid=f:39564a.pdf.
32 Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2008, H.R. 2764, Pub. L. No. 110-161, available at
http://frwebgate.access.gpo.gov/cgi-
bin/getdoc.cgi?dbname=100cong..house committee.prints&docid=f:39564f.pdf.
33 AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 7.
34 Id. at55.
35 Id. at 6-7.
36 Id.
37 Id.
38 Id.
39 30 U.S.C. § 813(a) (2000).
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Given its limited resources and reach, OSHA should leverage its re-
sources and maximize its impact by issuing strong penalties when it inspects
and finds violations of the law. But unfortunately this has not happened. The
average civil penalty for a serious violation of the OSH Act - defined as a haz-
ard posing a "substantial probability that death or serious physical harm could
result"''4 - is $873, far less than the statutory maximum of $7,000.41 Willful
violations of the law carry a maximum civil penalty of $70,000, but OSHA's
average fine in these cases is just $32,000.42 By contrast, major environmental
statutes provide for a penalty of up to $25,000 per day for certain violations,
thus providing a far stronger incentive for employers to comply with environ-
mental laws.4 3  OSHA penalties should be increased, 44 but in the meantime,
OSHA should make maximum use of its existing enforcement authority to help
bring about greater compliance with the law.
HI. CRIMINAL ENFORCEMENT OF THE OSH ACT
The criminal penalty provisions of the OSH Act are appallingly weak.
A willful violation of an OSHA standard that results in a worker being killed
carries a maximum penalty of six months in jail - a simple misdemeanor.45
There is no criminal penalty provision in the OSH Act for violations that maim
workers, sicken them from exposure to toxic substances, or place workers in
harm's way.
By contrast, under the federal Wild Horses and Burros Act, maliciously
harassing a wild burro carries a maximum imprisonment of twice as long (one
year) as willfully violating an OSHA standard and killing a worker (six
months).46  In addition, all of the major environmental laws have significantly
stronger criminal penalty provisions compared to the OSH Act.47 Not only do
environmental laws authorize criminal penalties for knowing violations of the
law, regardless of whether specific harm occurs, but these laws also authorize
criminal penalties for "knowing endangerment" - putting another person at im-
40 29 U.S.C. § 666(k) (2000).
41 AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 45.
42 Id.
43 E.g., Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(d) (2000); Resource Conservation and Recovery
Act (RCRA), 42 U.S.C. § 6928(c) (2000); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7524(a) (2000).
44 See Section IV.C. infra.
45 29 U.S.C. § 666(e).
46 Compare 16 U.S.C. § 1338(a)(3) with 29 U.S.C. § 666(e).
47 Compare Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(2) (authorizing imprisonment for not more
than 3 years for knowing violations of the Clean Water Act) and Resource Conservation and
Recovery Act, 42 U.S.C. § 6928 (authorizing criminal penalties of not to exceed two years for
knowing violations of RCRA) with Occupational Safety and Health Act, 29 U.S.C. § 666(e) (vio-
lations that result in the death of an employee are punishable by "a fine of not more than $10,000
or by imprisonment for not more than six months").
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minent danger of death or serious bodily injury. These offenses carry a maxi-
mum penalty of 15 years in prison.48  In contrast, the OSH Act has no such
"knowing endangerment" provision - it requires that a worker be killed before
criminal penalties are authorized.4 9
Not surprisingly, given the stronger statutory authority, the Environ-
mental Protection Agency and the Department of Justice ("DOJ") have been
much more vigorous in prosecuting environmental crimes, as compared to the
pitiful track record under the OSH Act. It appears from government records that
in the OSH Act's entire 38-year history, there have been a total of 68 prosecu-
tions, and defendants have served a total of 42 months in jail.50  By contrast, in
just one year - FY 2006 - there were 470 defendants convicted under environ-
mental laws, resulting in 154 years of jail time and $43 million in fines. 51 Envi-
ronmental enforcement has actually dropped in recent years.52 Still, there were
more prosecutions in that one year under environmental laws than in the OSH
Act's entire history.
OSHA rarely refers cases to the Department of Justice, and the Depart-
ment of Justice rarely decides to pursue prosecution of these cases because the
penalty - a misdemeanor - is simply not worth the investment of prosecutorial
resources. In recent years, prosecutors have begun bringing cases against em-
ployers who put their workers at risk not under the OSH Act, but under envi-
ronmental laws designed to protect the public from harm.53 While these efforts
are commendable, it is a sad reflection on the state of the workplace safety law
that prosecutors must rely on laws aimed at protecting the environment to ad-
dress conduct that harms workers.
48 See Clean Water Act, 33 U.S.C. § 1319(c)(3); Resource Conservation and Recovery Act, 42
U.S.C. § 6928(e); Clean Air Act, 42 U.S.C. § 7524.
49 29 U.S.C. 666(e).
50 CRIMINAL REFERRALS BY OSHA TO DOJ OR US ATTORNEYS (on file with author). Some of
these prosecutions were for false statements, not willful violations of OSHA standards. One con-
viction carrying a 30-month sentence was excluded from the totals presented in the main text
because it exceeds the maximum penalty under the OSH Act so presumably the case was brought
under other statutory authority.
51 Environmental Protection Agency press release (Nov. 15, 2006), available at
http://yosemite.epa.gov/opa/admpress.nsf/2467feca6O368729852573590040443d/f93f57c9574a25
fd85257227006685c5!OpenDocument (reporting on years of incarceration and penalties); John
Solomon & Juliet Eilperin, Bush's EPA is Pursuing Fewer Polluters: Probes and Prosecutions
Have Declined Sharply, WASHINGTON POST, Sept. 30, 2007, at Al (reporting that the number of
people convicted for environmental crimes dropped from 738 in 2001 to 470 in 2006, and that the
number of cases opened by EPA dropped from 482 in 2001 to 305 in 2006).
52 Solomon, supra note 51.
53 See, Testimony of David Uhlmann before the Senate Committee on Health, Education,
Labor and Pensions (April 29, 2008), available at
http://help.senate.gov/Hearings/2008- 04 _29/200804 29.html (describing the prosecution of
worker endangerment cases by the Department of Justice under environmental laws).
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For example, consider the case of Eric Ho.54 Ho bought an old hospital
in Houston, Texas, with the aim of renovating the building and converting it into
residential housing. The building contained asbestos, a carcinogen for which
OSHA has extensive rules requiring training, respirators, and other protective
measures. Ho hired 11 workers, who turned out to be undocumented workers
from Mexico, to do the work. Ho ignored OSHA's asbestos rules and did not
provide the workers with any training, respirators, or other protective equip-
ment.
A city inspector visited the worksite and issued a stop-work order until
Ho got the necessary work permits. While Ho was negotiating with a licensed
contractor, he continued with the asbestos-removal work. To escape detection
by the authorities, Ho directed all work to be done at night. Some of the work-
ers lived at the worksite, where they had no source of drinking water and only a
single portable toilet.
Two months into the job, a supervisor went to open a water line, which
turned out to be a gas line. When the supervisor started his truck, an explosion
occurred, releasing asbestos into the air around the worksite. OSHA inspected,
and issued citations against Ho for failing to provide workers with respirators
and training as required by OSHA's asbestos standards.55 OSHA did not have
the authority to prosecute Ho criminally for exposing his workers to a known
carcinogen, because the OSH Act only authorizes criminal prosecutions in situa-
tions where workers are killed. However, Ho was convicted of criminal viola-
tions of the Clean Air Act for failing to give the authorities notice of the asbes-
tos removal and for violating EPA's work practice standards for asbestos.56 The
irony that OSHA could not bring criminal charges against Ho for exposing his
workers to asbestos, but the EPA could prosecute him for violating its rules,
speaks volumes about the inequities in existing laws.
This appalling shortcoming in the OSH Act is further illustrated by the
case of Allen Elias.57 In 1996, Elias, the owner of Evergreen Resources, or-
dered four employees to enter a 36 x 11 foot storage tank to wash out sludge
containing cyanide. Elias did not provide any safety equipment to his employ-
ees. Forty-five minutes into the work, one of the workers collapsed. Firefight-
ers rescued him and rushed him to the hospital. Elias denied that there was cya-
nide in the tank, but the treating physician, suspecting cyanide poisoning, ad-
ministered a cyanide antidote and the worker responded positively. 8
The federal government prosecuted Elias for, among other charges, stor-
ing or disposing of hazardous waste without a permit, and putting others in im-
minent danger of death or serious bodily injury in violation of the Resource
54 Chao v. Occupational Safety and Health Review Commission, 401 F.3d 355 (5th Cir. 2005).
55 Id. at 360-6 1.
56 United States v. Ho, 311 F.3d 589, 591 (5th Cir. 2002).
57 United States v. Elias, 269 F.3d 1003, 1007-08 (9th Cir. 2001).
58 Id.
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Conservation and Recovery Act. Elias was convicted of this charge.59 Here
again, OSHA could not have prosecuted Elias for endangering his workers un-
der the OSH Act, because the law only reaches willful violations that cause a
fatality.
In recent years, the Department of Justice's Environmental Crimes Sec-
tion, in cooperation with OSHA and EPA, has embarked upon a worker endan-
germent initiative that seeks to prosecute employers under environmental laws
for violations that put workers at risk.6° The agencies share information about
companies with shoddy safety and environmental records, and prosecutors util-
ize the stronger criminal penalty provisions under environmental laws to prose-
cute violators. The partnership has started to show positive results.
For example, Motiva Enterprises, an oil refining company, pled guilty
to negligent endangerment and committing environmental crimes at a facility in
Delaware. 6' Recently, DOJ successfully concluded a prosecution of officials of
McWane, Inc., the nation's largest manufacturer of cast-iron pipe, for "conspir-
ing to evade workplace safety and environmental laws .. . and bullying em-
ployees into silence about dangerous working conditions. 62 These convictions
represented the fifth time since 2003 that a McWane plant had been found guilty
of federal crimes relating to workplace safety and environmental violations.63
These efforts to use the criminal penalty provisions of environmental
laws to hold employers accountable for endangering their workers are to be
commended. And, until the criminal penalty provisions of the OSH Act are
strengthened, OSHA officials should continue to work in concert with the De-
partment of Justice and EPA to see that criminal prosecutions are brought
against companies that harm workers. Still, it is appalling that the nation's job
safety law does not authorize prosecutions for these actions directly, and that
justice must be sought under environmental laws. The disparity in criminal en-
forcement provisions between workplace safety and environmental laws ur-
gently needs to be corrected.
IV. THE OSH ACT NEEDS TO BE STRENGTHENED
It is long past time for the OSH Act to be updated and strengthened.
OSHA's enforcement authority and penalties need to be put at least on par with
laws protecting the environment. The agency needs far greater resources to do
its job. Workers need greater protection when they report injuries and speak out
about job hazards. Employers need to be more proactive in identifying and cor-
59 Id. at 1008.
60 David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, With Little Fanfare, a New Effort to Prosecute Employ-
ers that Flout Safety Laws, N.Y. TIMES, May 2, 2005, at A17.
61 Id.
62 David Barstow, Guilty Verdicts in New Jersey Worker Safety Trial, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 27,
2006, at A22.
63 Id.
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recting hazards so that fatalities, injuries, and illnesses can be prevented. While
an exhaustive list of necessary improvements is beyond the scope of this Article,
the following three reforms would improve the legal protections available to
workers and make a real difference in protecting their safety and health on the
job.
A. Improve Protections for Workers Who Speak Out About Injuries and
Job Hazards
The OSH Act is premised on the full and active involvement of em-
ployees. While the law places legal responsibility for providing a safe work-
place squarely on employers, employees are encouraged to participate fully in
protecting their health and safety on the job. The OSH Act and regulations
promulgated under it give workers the right to information about job hazards,64
the right to file OSHA complaints, 65 the right to accompany OSHA on inspec-
tions, 66 the right to participate in enforcement proceedings, 67 and more. The
OSH Act also says that it is unlawful for employers to retaliate against workers
for exercising these rights.68  Unfortunately, the legal protections are extremely
weak.
Many responsible employers want their employees to feel free to come
forward and speak out about job hazards. Workers are often the most knowl-
edgeable about safety and health conditions on the job, as they work in these
conditions day in and day out. Workers often have practical and cost-effective
suggestions for how to address hazards.
Unfortunately, not all employers are as open to their employees' in-
volvement. Some employers actively discourage reporting by harassing or re-
taliating against workers who blow the whistle on job hazards or report injuries.
All too often after a workplace tragedy we learn that workers were aware of job
hazards but were afraid to come forward and speak out for fear of losing their
jobs, or that their complaints were ignored.69 And unfortunately, the OSH Act is
very weak in protecting their rights.
64 29 U.S.C. § 655(b)(7) (2000).
65 29 U.S.C. § 657(0(1) (2000).
66 29 U.S.C. § 657(e). The Mine Act explicitly states that a representative of miners may
accompany the MSHA inspector without loss of pay. 30 U.S.C. § 813(f). The OSH Act is silent
on the issue of walkaround pay. OSHA attempted to adopt a policy regulation requiring wal-
karound pay in 1977, but the policy was invalidated on procedural grounds. Chamber of Com-
merce v. OSHA, 636 F.2d 464, 470-71 (D.C. Cir. 1980).
67 29 U.S.C. § 659 (c).
68 29 U.S.C. § 660(c).
69 See, e.g., Kerry Hall, The Cruelest Cuts, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Feb. 10, 2008, at Al (re-
porting on poultry workers who got fired for reporting injuries); Peter Kilbom, In Aftermath of
Deadly Fire, a Poor Town Struggles Back, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 25, 1991, at Al (workers at the Im-
perial Food chicken processing plant did not raise safety complaints because they feared losing
their jobs); Written Statement of Cesar Sanchez to the House Comm. on Education and Labor
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Workers in unionized workplaces who are covered by a collective bar-
gaining agreement have stronger protections and quicker remedies available to
them if they face retaliation. But the vast majority of workers - 87 percent - do
not yet have union representation and are left with the weak provisions of the
OSH Act or similar state laws.7°
There are three fundamental shortcomings in the OSH Act's anti-
retaliation provisions. First, the statute of limitations for bringing a case for-
ward is ridiculously short. Workers who are fired or otherwise retaliated against
for reporting job hazards to the employer or to OSHA must file a complaint with
OSHA within 30 days of the retaliatory action.7' This short statute of limita-
tions gives workers an extremely limited period of time in which to evaluate
their situation and decide whether to bring a complaint. Other major employ-
ment laws, like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, give workers at least 180 days
to bring a charge of discrimination or retaliation, and other federal whistle-
blower statutes have a longer statute of limitations as well.72
Second, there is no real private right of action to bring retaliation claims
under the OSH Act. Workers are dependent on the Secretary of Labor to inves-
tigate and prosecute their cases. If the Secretary of Labor chooses not to pursue
the case, workers have no ability to bring the case before an administrative
agency or court for review. This is a serious shortcoming in the law.
The Secretary of Labor pursues only a small minority of the retaliation
complaints it receives from workers. In fiscal year 2006, the Department of
Labor received 1,865 complaints under the various anti-retaliation statutes it
enforces, and dismissed 1,240 cases.73 The Secretary of Labor issued 29 "merits
(Oct. 3, 2007) (concerning his brother Manual Sanchez, who died at Crandall Canyon and whose
concerns about safety at the mine had been ignored by the company), available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/100307CesarSanchezTestimony.pdf.
70 See BUREAU OF LABOR STATISTICS, U.S. DEPARTMENT OF LABOR, UNION MEMBERS IN 2007 1
(Jan. 2008), available at http://www.bls.gov/news.release/pdf/union2.pdf. The National Labor
Relations Act (NLRA) generally prohibits retaliation against workers engaged in "concerted activ-
ity," which can include speaking out about health and safety concerns. See, e.g. NLRB v. Wash-
ington Aluminum, 370 U.S. 9 (1962). However, the NLRA's protections and remedies, like the
OSH Act's, are weak. See Wilma B. Liebman, Decline and Disenchantment: Reflections on the
Aging of the National Labor Relations Board, 28 BERKELEY J. EMP. & LAB. L. 569, 579 (2007).
71 29 U.S.C. § 660(c)(2).
72 See Civil Rights Act, Title VII, 42 USC § 2000e-5(e) (2000). See also Surface Transporta-
tion Act, 49 U.S.C. § 31105(b) (2000) (180 day statute of limitations for motor carrier employees
to file retaliation claims with the Secretary of Labor). The Mine Act also has a relatively short
statute of limitations for retaliation claims - 60 days - but it still allows workers twice as long as
under the OSH Act to come forward with a discrimination complaint. 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2)
(2000).
73 See Statement of Richard E. Fairfax, Director of Enforcement Programs, OSHA, U.S. Dept.
of Labor, Before the Subcommittee on Workforce Protections, Committee on Education and La-
bor, U.S. House of Representatives (May 15, 2007), available at
http://edlabor.house.gov/testimony/051507RichardFairfaxTestimony.pdf.
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findings" and settled 294 cases that year.74 In the cases that were dismissed or
not otherwise pursued, workers were left without further recourse under the
OSH Act.
The Mine Act, by comparison, gives workers or their representatives the
opportunity to litigate their own retaliation cases if the Secretary chooses not
to.75 Miners or their representatives can bring their cases to an administrative
law judge of the Federal Mine Safety and Health Review Commission and seek
appropriate relief.
Finally, the Mine Act is superior to the OSH Act in another key respect.
Under the Mine Act, workers who file retaliation charges are entitled to imme-
diate preliminary reinstatement while their cases are pending as long as the Sec-
retary of Labor determines that the case is not frivolous.7 6 Miners do not suffer
loss of pay or employment while their retaliation cases are pending. This puts
workers and employers on a more equal footing during the pendency of retalia-
tion cases, and presumably leads to quicker resolution, because employers do
not have an economic incentive to drag out the case. There is no corresponding
right to preliminary reinstatement under the OSH Act. Workers who are fired
for exercising their rights are out of a job while the case is pending.
Workers would be far better protected if the statute of limitations under
the OSH Act was lengthened to bring it in line with other anti-retaliation laws, if
workers had the right to litigate their own retaliation cases instead of being sole-
ly reliant on the Secretary of Labor, and if the law provided for preliminary re-
instatement while retaliation cases were pending.
In addition, the law should be clarified to more explicitly state that it is
illegal for employers to discipline, discharge, or otherwise retaliate against
workers for reporting injuries and illnesses, or to have policies that discourage
reporting. While OSHA's recordkeeping rules state that it is a violation of the
anti-retaliation provisions of the OSH Act for employers to discourage reporting
of injuries and illnesses, 77 enforcement of this provision has been virtually non-
existent. Particularly given the recent emphasis by OSHA on employer's injury
and illness records for purposes of targeting inspections, it is essential that
workers not be discouraged from coming forward to report injuries.78 While
OSHA could and should do more on its own under existing statutory authority
74 Id.
75 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(3).
76 30 U.S.C. § 815(c)(2) (Secretary's investigation shall commence within 15 days of the
complaint, and if the "Secretary finds that such complaint was not frivolously brought, the Com-
mission... shall order the immediate reinstatement of the miner pending final order on the com-
plaint.")
77 29 C.F.R. § 1904.36 (2007).
78 See Kerry Hall, The Cruelest Cuts, CHARLOTrE OBSERVER, Feb. 10, 2008, at Al (reporting
on underreporting of injuries by a major poultry company, and observing that "the government
rewards companies that report low injury rates by inspecting them less often. And regulators
rarely check whether companies are reporting accurately.").
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to prohibit policies that discourage reporting and to protect workers who come
forward, Congress should make this right more explicit in the OSH Act and
provide meaningful procedures and remedies for enforcement.
Finally, OSHA should make a serious investment in worker training to
better ensure that workers are knowledgeable about their rights under the OSH
Act. Worker training was a priority early in the OSH Act's history, but over the
years the agency's investment in worker training has withered away. When
OSHA first started providing training and technical assistance grants in the
1970s, it provided an identical amount - $17 million - to employers and to
worker organizations.79 Over the years, training grants to worker organizations
have been whittled down, while training and technical assistance to employers
has grown. In fiscal year 2007, OSHA devoted $134 million to compliance
assistance for employers, but the Bush Administration proposed nothing for
worker training.80 Given the importance of worker participation to the OSH
Act's structure and implementation, greater funding for worker training pro-
grams to better inform workers of their rights is essential to the OSH Act's suc-
cess.
B. Require Employers to Have Safety and Health Programs
Even with a significant increase in funding, which is urgently needed,
OSHA will never have the resources to inspect more than a small fraction of
workplaces each year, and it will never be able to set enforceable standards for
the myriad of hazards that workers face on the job. In its entire thirty-eight year
history, OSHA has set comprehensive standards for only fifty-one safety haz-
ards and thirty-six health hazards.81 OSHA has no comprehensive standards for
hazards like ergonomics, combustible dust, tuberculosis and other airborne dis-
eases, silica, hearing conservation for construction workers, and many other
hazards.82
Even under the best of circumstances, with an administration that be-
lieves in strong workplace regulations to protect workers, the rulemaking proc-
ess is slow and cumbersome. But in recent years, led by an administration hos-
tile to regulation, the rulemaking process at OSHA has "virtually ground to a
halt. 8
3
79 Is OSHA Working for Working People?: Hearing Examining the Effectiveness of the Occu-
pational Safety and Health Administration Before the Subcomm. on Employment and Workplace
Safety of the S. Comm. on Health, Education, Labor, and Pensions, 1 1 0 th Cong. 21 (2007) (state-
ment of Peg Seminario, Occupational Safety and Health Director, AFL-CIO).
80 See AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 54.
81 Id. at 47-49.
82 Id. at 10 (silica and hearing conservation), 17 (ergonomics), 47-49 (complete listing of
standards), 50 (tuberculosis).
83 Id. at 9. The Bush Administration removed 24 significant rulemakings from OSHA's regu-
latory agenda, including rules on hazards like metalworking fluids, occupational exposure to
tuberculosis, glycol ethers, and indoor air quality. Id. at 50.
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The tone was set early on, when the first law of substance signed by
President George W. Bush was a repeal of an ergonomics standard that was
started by Secretary of Labor Elizabeth Dole during the first President Bush
administration. 84 The George W. Bush Administration has shifted its focus
from standard-setting to voluntary partnerships with businesses and trade asso-
ciations.85 Only a handful of standards have been issued in recent years, and
two of them - rules on hexavalent chromium and a rule requiring employers to
pay for workers' personal protective equipment - were a result of union litiga-
86tion.
OSHA's standard-setting system needs to be fixed. But even with a
functioning standard-setting system - one that could, for example, allow OSHA
to update its Permissible Exposure Limits for hundreds of toxic substances from
the current levels that are hopelessly out of date - OSHA will never be able to
set specific standards to protect workers from all workplace hazards.87
Congress anticipated this scenario when it crafted the OSH Act. The
OSH Act imposes two separate duties on employers: employers must comply
with specific OSHA standards, 88 and they have a "general duty" to protect
workers from "recognized hazards that are causing or are likely to cause death
or serious physical harm."89 OSHA can and does inspect and cite employers for
violations of the general duty clause.
One way to "operationalize" the general duty clause would be through a
rule requiring all employers to have a proactive program in place to identify and
correct hazards at their workplaces, with the full and active participation of em-
ployees. Injury and illness prevention programs, also known as safety and
health programs, are a well-recognized tool for addressing hazards in the work-
place. They are not a substitute for mandatory health and safety standards on
specific hazards, but they do provide a holistic means for proactively addressing
84 See Ergonomics Rule Disapproval, Pub. L. No. 107-5, 115 Stat. 7 (2001). See generally
Congress Axes OSHA Ergonomic Rules: Congressional Review Act of 1996, Mar. 7, 2001,
http://usgovinfo.about.com/1ibrary/weekly/aaO307Ola.htm (reciting the history of the OSHA
ergonomics rule).
85 AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 8-9.
86 See Public Citizen Health Research Group v. Chao, 314 F.3d 143 (3d Cir. 2002) (directing
OSHA to issue a standard on hexavalent chromium); In re: American Federation of Labor and
Congress of Industrial Organizations, No. 07-1001, 2007 WL 4545877 (D.C. Cir. Dec. 18, 2007)
(petition for mandamus to compel the Secretary of Labor to complete rulemaking on employer
payment for personal protective equipment); Employer Payment for Personal Protective Equip-
ment, 72 Fed. Reg. 64,342 (Nov. 15, 2007) (codified at 29 C.F.R. pts. 1910, 1915, 1917, 1918,
and 1926) (final rule on employer payment for personal protective equipment).
87 AFL-CIO, supra note 17, at 22 (explaining that OSHA's permissible exposure limits for
toxic substances were adopted in 1971 and codified existing values set by the American Confer-
ence of Governmental Industrial Hygienists (ACGIH) in the 1940s and 1950s, and describing
failed efforts at getting the limits updated).
88 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(2) (2000).
89 29 U.S.C. § 654(a)(1) (2000).
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hazards in a particular workplace, regardless of whether the hazard is addressed
by a particular OSHA standard. Employers with safety and health programs
regularly and systematically survey their workplaces, with the full involvement
of their employees, to identify hazards and implement solutions.90 Employers
with these programs typically find the programs to be very effective in helping
them proactively deal with hazards and prevent injuries and illnesses on the
job.91
Mandatory safety and health programs, and worker involvement
through safety and health committees, were cornerstones of comprehensive
OSHA reform in the 1990s, but these measures faced business opposition and
were not enacted.92 At least two states that run their own state OSHA programs
require employers to have safety and health programs to identify and correct
hazards at their workplaces.93
Other than ideological opposition from the Bush Administration and the
business community, it is difficult to fathom why OSHA has not made such a
common-sense measure a requirement for all employers. OSHA published
guidelines for establishing safety and health programs in the late 1980s 94 and
began the formal rulemaking process in the 1990s, but the rule was never com-
pleted. The Bush Administration then withdrew a safety and health program
rule from its regulatory agenda.95
Given the widespread recognition of their importance and value in pre-
venting work-related injuries and illnesses, Congress should insist that OSHA
immediately adopt a safety and health program rule, or directly legislate such a
90 See Safety and Health Program Management Guidelines: Issuance of Voluntary Guidelines
[hereinafter "Safety Guidelines"], 54 Fed. Reg. 3904, 3909 (Jan. 26, 1989) (describing major
elements of an effective safety and health program as (1) management commitment and employee
involvement, (2) worksite analysis, (3) hazard prevention and controls, and (4) safety and health
training.).
91 Id. at 3904 (citing sources for the agency's view that "[w]here effective safety and health
management is practiced, injury and illness rates are significantly less than rates at comparable
worksites where safety and health management is weak or non-existent.") See also Occupational
Safety and Health: Options for Improving Safety and Health in the Workplace: Briefing Report to
the Subcomm. on Health and Safety of the H. Comm. on Education and Labor, 101st Cong. 46-47
(1990), available at http://archive.gao.gov/d23t8/142142.pdf (recommending that OSHA consider
adopting a rule requiring safety and health programs, and reporting on research showing that
safety and health programs are effective at reducing workplace injuries and illnesses.).
92 Comprehensive Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, H.R. 3160, 102nd Cong.
(1992).
93 CAL. CODE. REGS. tit. 8, § 3203 (2003); WASH. ADMIN. CODE § 296-800-140 (2007).
94 See generally Safety Guidelines, supra note 90.
95 Compare Semiannual Agenda of Regulations, 67 Fed. Reg. 74,749, 74,749 (Dec. 9, 2002)
(Bush Administration regulatory agenda for OSHA, with no rule for safety and health programs
listed) with Department of Labor Unified Agenda: 2000 Regulatory Plan, 65 Fed. Reg. 73,408;
73,421-22 (Nov. 30, 2000) (explanation of proposed safety and health program rule).
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requirement. 96 Congress and OSHA could further enhance the effectiveness of
the rule by requiring a corporate official to certify, under penalty of perjury, that
a program is in place and is being actively implemented. Finally, the govern-
ment could promote the adoption of safety and health programs by making them
a precondition for receiving a federal contract. These reforms would help bring
about more proactive, preventive attention to safety and health hazards and re-
duce the number and toll of workplace injuries and illnesses.
C. Strengthen the OSH Act's Penalties
If the OSH Act is to be taken seriously by employers, there must be a
credible threat of significant consequences when they fail to follow the law.
The current penalties in the statute, and current enforcement practices by
OSHA, are insufficient to have this effect.97
The civil and criminal penalty provisions of the OSH Act pale in com-
parison to environmental laws, all of which have been amended and strength-
ened since their original passage.98 It is well past time for the OSH Act's pen-
alty provisions to be updated and strengthened.
The OSH Act's civil penalties were last increased in 1990 as a revenue-
raising measure as part of comprehensive budget reconciliation legislation. 99 In
the eighteen years since, OSHA's civil penalties have lost thirty-five percent of
their value due to inflation.l ° At the very least, the OSH Act's civil penalties
should be raised to keep pace with inflation, and a cost-of-living adjustment
should be added so that penalties will be regularly adjusted for inflation. Such a
96 Comprehensive OSHA Reform legislation was proposed in the early 1990s that required all
employers to have a safety and health program to identify and correct hazards. Comprehensive
Occupational Safety and Health Reform Act, S. 1622, 102d Cong. (1991); Comprehensive Occu-
pational Safety and Health Reform Act, H.R. 3160, 102d Cong. (1991). The legislation was never
adopted.
97 David Barstow & Lowell Bergman, OSHA to Address Persistent Violators of Job Safety
Rules, N.Y. Times, March 11, 2003, at Al (citing the comments of a former OSHA administrator
during the Reagan Administration as "among many experts across the ideological spectrum who
say they believe that the worst employers will not take OSHA seriously unless they face a lengthy
prison term for killing a worker through indifference to safety rules." "Six months is nuts," ac-
cording to the Reagan Administration official.
98 See, e.g., Solid Waste Disposal Act Amendments of 1980, Pub. L. No. 96-482, 94 Stat.
2334. (adding knowing endangerment criminal penalty provisions to the Resource Conservation
and Recovery Act); Hazardous and Solid Waste Amendments of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-616, 98
Stat. 3221 (increasing maximum prison term for knowing endangerment to 15 years); Water Qual-
ity Act of 1987, Pub. L. No. 100-4, 101 Stat. 7 (adding knowing endangerment criminal penalty
provisions to the Clean Water Act); Clean Air Act Amendments of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-549,
104 Stat. 2399 (increasing penalties for knowing endangerment under the Clean Air Act).
9 Omnibus Budget Reconciliation Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-508, 104 Stat. 1388.
100 U.S. Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics - Inflation Calculator,
http://www.bls.govfbls/inflation.htm (follow "CPI inflation calculator" hyperlink) (last visited
Sept. 5, 2008).
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requirement is in place for many other laws, by virtue of the Federal Civil Pen-
alties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, but Congress specifically excluded
OSHA (and the Internal Revenue Service) from its reach.' 0' That exclusion
should be corrected. 1
02
In addition, the OSH Act's criminal penalty provisions urgently need to
be strengthened and expanded. Prosecutors should not have to rely on environ-
mental protection laws to prosecute employers who put workers in harm's way.
Penalties should be substantially increased for violations of the OSH Act that
result in fatalities, and the law should be expanded, along the lines of the reck-
less endangerment provisions of environmental laws, so that employers can be
prosecuted for violations that injure workers, sicken them, or put them at risk of
serious harm. 10 3 And, as with these environmental laws, the OSH Act should be
clarified so that the appropriate corporate officials are subject to prosecution. In
the meantime, until the law is strengthened, OSHA should continue to work
with the EPA and the Department of Justice to make maximum use of the crim-
inal penalty provisions of environmental laws.
V. CONCLUSION
Like the Mine Act, the OSH Act has brought about vast improvements
in the safety and health of American workers. But, unlike the Mine Act, work-
place tragedies have not brought about comprehensive and meaningful reforms
to update and strengthen the law. Congress needs to correct the shortcomings in
the OSH Act. It can start by adopting the reforms outlined above. These im-
provements would go a long way toward preventing future tragedies and helping
to make the OSH Act's promise of a safe job for every worker a reality.
101 Federal Civil Penalties Inflation Adjustment Act of 1990, Pub. L. No. 101-410, 104 Stat.
890.
102 OSHA Reform legislation was proposed in 2007 that would, among other measures, require
periodic inflation adjustments on OSHA civil penalties. See Protecting America's Workers Act,
S. 1244, 110th Cong. § 308 (2007); Protecting America's Workers Act, H.R. 2049, 110th Cong. §
308 (2007).
103 Legislation to strengthen the criminal penalty provisions in the OSH Act was introduced in
1990 and subsequent sessions of Congress, but was never enacted. See, e.g., OSHA Criminal
Penalty Reform Act: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Labor of the S. Comm. on Labor and Hu-
man Resources, 102d Cong. (1991). Enhanced criminal penalty provisions are included in the
Protecting America's Workers Act. S. 1244 § 308; H.R. 2049 § 308.
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